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Titel |
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The doctrine of a closed physical universe |
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Geplaatst door |
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Titus Rivas |
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Samenvatting |
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Short exploration of analytical and empirical reasons for believing in a
closed physical universe. |
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Tekst |
The doctrine of a closed physical universe
by Titus
Rivas
The notion of a physically closed universe is central to the
philosophical current of of physicalism. In general, physicalism is
(following a definition I have adopted from John Beloff) the theory that
everything in the physical universe happens solely and exclusively
because of physical factors. In other words, there are no non-physical
causes and if anything non-physical exists, it is by definition utterly
causally powerless, i.e. it has no impact whatsoever and it is caused
itself by physical factors alone.
In this short paper I will explore the two kinds of arguments that are
given for this remarkable, existentially unattractive and yet very
influential view.
Empirical argument for a closed physical universe
The main reason why scientists believe in a closed physical universe is
the physical evidence they have collected for the universality of
physical laws and the conservation of energy. According to such
scientists there is no evidence for any non-physical factors that would
go against the supposedly closed nature of physical reality. For them,
this is not so much an apriori insight, but a matter of fact.
I think we should realise that the empirical reason could only be strong
if there were absolutely no empirical evidence for any non-physical
factors. However, there really is quite a lot of such evidence,
especially from parapsychological studies into psychokinesis. Any
open-minded empirical scientist eager to believe in a closed physical
university should give such evidence a lot of special attention as it
just might falsify his cherished theory.
Analytical argument for a closed physical universe
More serious than the empirical reason to believe in a closed physical
universe is of course the claim that it would be illogical to believe in
an open physical universe that could be affected by non-physical
factors. We should not confuse this argument with the 'logical' argument
that believing in an open universe would be incompatible with empirical
data. This is because a logical deduction from empirical data can
ultimately be seen as an empirical argument (all good arguments should
be rational, but this does not mean that all arguments are purely
analytical).
The structure of the analytical argument for a closed physical reality
amounts to the claim that an open universe would require 'magic', i.e.
that it would clash with the basic ontological way we conceive of
reality. Now, this argument is only important if we can be sure that
what we think about physical reality and its relation to non-physical
entities is true. If not, the argument is circular, meaning that it
presupposes what it desires to prove. We actually cannot be sure,
because there is no conclusive apriori reason to suppose that the
physical world cannot be influenced by non-physical factors. Therefore,
the argument really begs the question and may be translated as: "we
should not believe in an open physical world because we do not believe
in an open physical world". It is like saying "we should believe in God,
because we believe in God" or indeed "we should believe it can only rain
during September, because we believe it can only rain during September".
If every scholar thought this way, no intellectual progress would ever
be possible.
The way things are may only be magical or miraculous as compared to our
believe systems; from an objective viewpoint they simply are the way
they are.
However, there is an even more fatal blow against the analytical
argument in favour of a closed physical universe. If we accept the
existence of non-physical entities such as qualitative subjective
experiences and if we accept that we are able to know that they exist
and if we also accept that we are able to talk and write about them in a
meaningful, realistic way, it must mean that these non-physical entities
have had a causal impact, not only on our cognitive apparatus and memory
bank, but also on our
motor system as is
demonstrated whenever we express our conceptual knowledge of subjective
experiences as stored in our conceptual memory via speach and writing.
It is analytically absurd to acknowledge the knowability of the
existence of subjective experiences and at the same time deny that they
have an impact on our physical actions. Either one accepts the knowable
existence of subjective experiences (or other non-physical entities) and
our capacity to physically use symbols to communicate about these in a
meaningful way, or one should abandon the notion of knowable
non-physical subjective experiences altogether. Anyone who believes
there are non-physical aspects to his or her own subjective awareness
which he can meaningfully think and talk about should therefore abandon
the all too popular notion of a closed physical universe for a purely
analytical reason alone. Logically speaking, a closed physical universe
simply does not make sense.
Also see: Exit
Epiphenomenalism
Nijmegen, 2007.
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Online at
http://www.txtxs.nl/artikel.asp?artid=620 |
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Gebruikte steekwoorden |
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physicalism, interactionism, epiphenomenalism, ontology, causation,
metaphysics, closed physical universe, psychogenic causation |
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