

Francis Suarez on the efficiency of substantial forms.(Essay)

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IN THE FIFTEENTH DISPUTATION of his *Disputationae Metaphysicae*, (1) Francis Suarez deals with the problem of the existence of substantial forms prior to defining them. After claiming that it is impossible to learn about the forms through experience, the Jesuit gives the following reasons to prove that substantial forms really exist:

1. at least one natural substance, namely the human being, is constituted by matter and form;
2. forms are necessary to explain the essential differences between beings;
3. forms are necessary to explain the return of a thing to its connatural state after being extrinsically affected;
4. forms are necessary to explain why the intense application of a power impedes the full application of another one;
5. without forms, substantial change lacks an adequate final term. (2)

Let us first examine premise (3). According to it, it is possible to conclude that substantial forms exist through the observation of the accidents and operations of natural beings. Suarez uses a very simple example to build his case: water receives an accidental form, namely heat, when it is heated by the action of an extrinsic agent, namely fire. (3) When the fire's action stops, the water naturally tends to cool by a different action caused--presumably--by the water itself. The water's return to its original coolness must be taken as an essential and necessary action of water since it always cools after being affected by heat. Furthermore, since every action is caused by an agent, then the production of an accidental form such as coldness must be caused by an agent that acts permanently on water. *Prima facie*, this cause or principle can be either external or internal to the water itself. Nonetheless, the only external causes that always have an impact on water are the surrounding air and the celestial bodies, and none of them can be the real cause of water becoming cool again. Air cannot cool water because it is not as cold as water and because when the water is warmed by an external source, so is the air. Furthermore, celestial bodies cannot cool water, because they act on it remotely and they are not ordered to this kind of action. Thus, it is necessary to accept that an internal principle cools water and is therefore the reason why coldness is essential to it.

What is the nature of this principle? Suarez answers straight-forwardly: it is a substantial form. First, he dismisses the possibility of identifying this principle with some unwarmed pockets of water that later cool the entire substance. Suarez thinks that water is uniformly heated, so there cannot be any pockets of water that remain cool. If there were, one would have to posit a cause that enables them to remain cool but that would turn out not to exist. Second, he rejects the suggestion that the internal principle might be some kind of active quality, such as the essence of coldness or some other higher quality that virtually contains coldness. Suarez rejects the former alternative because the essence of coldness does not remain in the water after it is heated, and even if it did, one could not explain how a diminished quality would increase in intensity, or how it could overcome a different and more intense quality all by itself. The principle also cannot be a higher quality because it would either lead to an infinite regress, since the virtual quality would need a higher one that contains it, or else it would be nothing other than a substantial form. (4)

Coldness is a primary accident without which water cannot exist as water. The inseparability of this kind of accident can only be explained by its union with some intrinsic principle of substance. Nevertheless, if cold is a proper accident of water it is not because of its union with matter, since prime matter by definition is the first subject devoid of any accident, nor because of its union with another accident, since accidents do not exist by themselves. Coldness rather is an inseparable accident of water because substantial forms

exist and are the root of coldness, moistness, density, hotness and any possible inseparable accident of the corresponding substances. Therefore, Suarez concludes that some actions of natural substances can only be caused by the unifying and acting form of the compound. That means that if we deny that forms exist, then we are not able to give a reason for the behavior of natural things. One could object that argument (3) is out of date and does not hold up in the face of a more sophisticated explanation of the empirical phenomenon. Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that this objection does not change the fact that Suarez's explanation must surely have been considered as scientific in the late sixteenth century and, secondly, that the current validity of the argument is not the focus of this paper. Indeed, for the purposes of this article, I will presume that substantial forms exist and that Suarez proves their existence via any of the arguments given above. What I am really interested in doing is to stress that argument (3) suggests a stronger claim than the sole existence of forms, namely that substantial forms are able to act on the compound they inform. (5) From now on, I shall refer to this Suarezian thesis by the name of the "principle of formal efficiency" or PFE.

I

The first thing that should be noted is that the PFE does not refer to the substantial form as a formal cause; (6) instead it raises the possibility of describing it as a proximate and essential efficient cause. Only in a few cases can substantial forms be rightly considered as efficient principles. If some empirical phenomena, such as the cooling of water or the downward movement of heavy bodies, are taken as instances of the form's capacities of action, then it must be said that the direct efficiency of the substantial form is constrained to the production of its proper and inseparable accidents. As was stated above, these accidental forms are the most intimate qualities of the substance and cannot be produced by another accident without positing an infinite regress in their causal chain. Hence, it is necessary that some accidental properties be produced by means of the substance's form: "And this view is highly probable. For since a substantial form exists as first act, whereas an accidental form exists as a second act, it is probable that the substantial form has a certain power for having its proper accidents emanate from it." (7) This mode of action by which the form produces the compound's essential qualities is called natural emanation or natural resulting.

Considered as an action, natural emanation is the form's efficient causality: that is, the transition between the form and the proper accident. This means that natural emanation produces a relation of dependence of the accident upon the form, and further that it can really be distinguished from its principle and its term. Thus, proper accidents are authentically caused by the substantial form, and they do not just follow from it by reason or illation.

The immediate efficiency of substantial forms has two different modalities. Sometimes the production of the accident occurs after that of the substantial form; at other times, however, both take place at the same time. When the form is previously produced, it is clear that the natural emanation involves some kind of efficiency and that it is a real action, as when the water cools off or when a heavy body falls down. "The reason is that in such a case something that did not exist beforehand begins in the subject, and it begins to exist per se, without the de novo production of any other thing. Therefore, it begins to exist through some efficient cause and through a proper action and change. Hence, that action is a proper cooling [in the one case] and a local motion [in the other]." (8) By contrast, it is a little bit more complicated to acknowledge that natural emanation is an action when the natural resulting is simultaneous with the form's production. Nonetheless, even when this happens, there are two actions involved. "For simultaneity in duration does not destroy the distinction [between the production of the substance and the emanation of the accident], especially given the fact that even though they are naturally simultaneous, they can be separated supernaturally--which is a sufficient ground for a distinction." (9) If God wanted to, He could create a soul and not its powers. If that were the case, then it would be evident that the action by which the substance is produced is different from the action by which the accident exists. Hence, even when the substantial form's production is simultaneous with the production of its proper accidents, it must be acknowledged that both are not part of only one term, but rather that logically and metaphysically speaking, the accidents naturally result from the form.

In spite of the fact that the PFE is the assertion that forms can be efficient causes of only one being, some scholars, such as Abril Castello Vidal and Eleuterio Elorduy, have proffered another interpretation of this principle in an attempt to shed light on other actions besides the production of the substance's proper accidents. For example, they speak of transcendental resulting as they depict the emergence of logical truth and moral good as an emanation from the transcendentals of truth and good. (10) Personally, I find this reading to be an overestimation of this action. The PFE is a Suarezian thesis referring to a specific action whose main importance is that it enables Suarez to account for the essential link between the form

and its natural properties.

II

Notwithstanding the apparent simplicity of the PFE, it may be possible to uphold a weaker interpretation of this principle. According to this weaker interpretation, substantial forms do not act immediately on the substance in which they inhere, but only through its accidental forms. While up to now the position defended was that the forms exercise a perfect efficiency by their own virtue, this weaker reading holds that substantial forms cannot act without the help of certain accidental forms that are really different from them. Suarez subscribes to both interpretations. "On the one hand, he held that it is not impossible for finite substances to act immediately, and indeed he held that with respect to their properties or necessary accidents they do act immediately.... On the other hand, he also held that all the specific powers we can enumerate in finite substances are really distinct from those substances.... Hence, he thought that any contingent actions of substances are mediated by powers distinct from them, but that those actions productive of the necessary and natural attributes of a substance, as coldness was held to be with respect to water, are caused directly by the substance's form, albeit as an instrument of the substance which produced the form." (11)

At first sight, the weak reading of the PFE may seem an easier thesis to uphold than the strong one. Once it is conceded, however, that the substantial form possesses the power to really act, then the weak version of the principle becomes untenable. For, the thesis that the form acts through the substance's accidents implies that the form is not an efficient cause on its own. This, in turn, is an assertion which is incompatible with the strong version of the PFE. In order to understand the modes in which the substantial form acts in a mediated fashion, it is necessary to invoke the distinction between primary causal principles *ut quo* and *ut quod*. (12) It is said that the form is a primary principle *ut quo* when it causes remotely or accidentally. In this case the substantial form does not act, but instead it is the foundation of the instrumental proximate causes. In this sense the fire's form is said to be an *ut quo* principle when the fire heats the water, for example. By contrast, the form is an *ut quod* principle of an action when it contributes to the activity of the substance's accidental forms or powers, (13) as when a substantial form is educed from matter. (14) "I claim, second, that one should not deny that a substantial form has its own proper and principal efficient causality with respect to the eduction of a similar form from the potency of the matter, and this because the substantial form has through itself an immediate influence conjoined to the latter in reality and is sufficiently proximate to it, with the result that in this sort of efficient causality the accident behaves as a conjoined instrument of the form and not as an instrument that is altogether separated *secundum causalitatem*." (15) Accidents do not produce a substantial form by themselves because no cause can produce a more perfect effect. (16) This is the reason that it is necessary to posit the involvement of a distinct substantial form. This does not mean, however, that the form is able to produce a similar form by itself, nor does it eliminate the accidents' proximate efficiency. (17) In the eduction, the participation of the accidents is just as necessary as the form's. They prepare the form's eduction through a previous action, and they also participate as instruments during the eduction. (18) So the fire's substantial form is a principal cause *ut quod* when it cooperates with the accident of heat in order to generate another fire, as when burning something. In turn, while heating the combustible, the heat prepares the eduction of the new fire and acts as an instrument of the agent's substantial form.

This distinction helps to point out that there are two ways of understanding the weak reading of the PFE. There is a first way, according to which the substantial form is just a condition for the existence of the substance's active powers. According to the second way, the form acts conjointly with the powers rooted in it. Again, this second way of understanding the efficiency of the form is constrained to a specific action: the eduction of a material form. Therefore, the weak reading of the PFE is only true when it refers to the form as a principle *ut quo*.

III

The PFE is also valid for souls, since they are substantial forms. (19) The consequence must be conceded because the soul gives being to the compound and is its principle of action. "So when [Aristotle] says that the soul is the principle by which we live, he refers to the intrinsic principle by which the subsistent and alive subject acts, and to which the action is attributed as to an agent. And that principle must necessarily be a genuine form because the form is both a principle of being and of operation." (20) On the other hand, the truth of the antecedent may be sufficiently confirmed if we consider that souls are more perfect than natural forms, and that a more perfect being in one genus can do everything the less perfect can. If the PFE is valid for souls, this means that the soul produces its own powers, (21) but also that the sensitive and vegetative souls act conjointly with their accidental forms to educe a similar form.

(22) In this way, intelligence and will result from the human soul, and the sensitive soul produces the substantial soul transmitted via the animal's semen.

In general, the soul is a more perfect form than any other substantial form, since a) it gives a more perfect being to the compound and therefore it acts more perfectly, b) it also removes the greatest potentiality among the forms, and c) it is the most perfect in its essence and entity since it possesses the maximum aptitude to inform matter. (23) As stated in (a), the soul's greater nobility enables it to be a principle of more perfect actions, namely the so called vital actions. (24) At the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle's *De anima*, Suarez describes these actions as those "that must not only be received in the acting being itself, but also must be carried out by the intrinsic principle of the agent." (25) This description sounds as if vital actions were just the same as immanent actions. But before ascribing this thesis to Francisco Suarez, we must first determine to which sense of immanence this presumption refers. Firstly, it can be said that

X is an immanent action if and only if X is an action whose term remains in the proximate power that produced it and, in addition, it can never be produced by any other subject. (26)

According to this characterization, the only members included in the set of immanent actions are the causality of the intelligence and of the will. Nevertheless, Suarez admits a second sense of "immanent" which is less restrictive and closer to common usage:

X is an immanent action if and only if X is an action whose term remains in the suppositum that acts.

In the light of this new description, "all vital motions can be described as immanent, both nutrition and growth, and also the local motions of animals; the same can be said of the natural motion of earth that tends downwards, or of water when it returns itself to its pristine coolness." (27) According to the second sense, the set of immanent actions is constituted by the sensitive and vegetative actions, but also by some natural actions. This twofold meaning of immanence results in a problem when trying to identify immanence with life, (28) just as the initial description of vital actions suggested. For if this equivalence were true, then either human actions would be vital or some natural substances would act vitally. In either case, Suarez would be reluctant to assent to such a thesis. Indeed, he defends the position that an inanimate body can act immanently, but not that it is alive. However, this is not a problem in Suarez's thought, but rather for his interpreters, who identify life with immanence. So before denying that some natural substances act by themselves and consequently denying the PFE, in this case, we must ask whether vital actions possess any other features besides immanence.

IV

Before tackling the problem of the difference between immanent and Vital actions, it is important to examine another distinction, namely that between immanent action and immanent act. This will allow us to eliminate the possibility of arguing that immanence and life are equal in terms of actions, but different when it comes to their acts, or vice versa. In addition, this distinction will help us clarify what Suarez understands as life.

Suarez distinguishes between immanent action and immanent act. An immanent action is an efficient causality and is neither a perfection of the agent, nor primarily ordered to it. On the other hand, an immanent act is an intrinsic perfection of the active power that produced it. The causality of Steve's will is an immanent action; but his act of loving is an immanent act produced by the immanent action that happens to be a perfection of Steve's will. So while the immanent action is "the true and proper efficient production of some acts that remain in the same powers they inform and by which they were produced," (29) the immanent act is the intrinsic term produced by the former. Suarez explains that the immanent act is a quality, since "in accordance with this act some qualitative predicates are rightfully applied to us, as when it is said that we are good or bad, wise, lovers, irascible, and so forth. Besides, these immanent acts are the forms that ultimately act and perfect the substance in which they inhere; therefore, the common notion of quality corresponds to them." (30) The quality is an accident that is not just added to the substance, but also completes it and makes up for its imperfections. (31) The immanent act is a quality of the class of dispositions by virtue, (32) either because it is the effect of a habit, or because it confers to a power its ultimate actuality and a perfection of a certain order. (33)

Another sign that immanent actions and acts are really different is that one can be modified without affecting the other. The immanent action can be altered by some variation on the part of the efficient

cause and, at the same time, the nature of the immanent act may remain unaltered by that same variation. The action of John loving P in [T.sub.1] is not the same action as John loving P in [T.sub.2]. This is the case because the action denominates the agent extrinsically by means of a transcendental or essential relation to it. Hence, it is in the action's essence to be related to an individual and particular active principle. Otherwise the action would denominate any of the agents capable of producing a specific effect, whether or not it is actually performing it. (34) By contrast, the immanent act does not change whenever something about the efficient cause or its circumstances changes. One and the same immanent act can be performed by all the agents that have the capacity to perform it. The act of judging that $A = A$ is just one, no matter whether it is performed by a rational agent with a habit or without it, or with the help of God or not, or by means of a long chain of reasoning or by a short one. The fact that each of these variables brings forth actions that are essentially different from each other confirms that an immanent quality remains unaltered when something changes the corresponding action, and consequently verifies the difference between actions and acts. (35)

Both the restricted and the broader sense of immanence are applied equally to immanent actions and immanent acts. This means that it is impossible to hold at the same time that only the causation of the intellect and will are immanent actions, but that sensation, growth, local motion, and cooling are immanent acts. In other words, the same sense of immanence is applied to actions and acts: immanent acts are produced only by immanent actions. So if vitality is intended to be interchangeable with immanence, then it will have to be according to only one or the other sense of immanence at a time. This conclusion leads us to the dilemma between admitting that only rational actions are vital or accepting a wider scope that includes some natural actions.

V

Neither of the horns of the dilemma may be ascribed to Francisco Suarez. Hence, if the distinguishing trait of a vital action does not derive from the fact that its principle and term coincide in a certain power, it must be looked for in the nature of its parts. Vital actions are distinguished from nonvital actions because the former have more perfect principles and terms. Vital principles are powers of a soul (36) and the vital terms are certain qualities or acts (which are specified by objects of a higher nobility than the objects of natural actions). (37) This remark sheds light on the difference between vital and immanent actions, but also on the distinction between vital actions and some natural actions like natural emanation and the education of substantial forms.

Regarding the first part, this means that if M is the set of immanent actions and V the set of vital actions, then it is false that $M \cap V = \emptyset$. By contrast, depending on which sense of immanence is employed, it will be true either that $M \subseteq V$ or $M \supseteq V$. According to the restrictive sense of immanence, every immanent action is a vital action, but not the other way around. Understanding and loving are the only two immanent actions that happen to also be vital, but there are other actions that in spite of not being immanent are vital, such as nourishing and sensing. The same follows for their respective acts: some vital acts are immanent, but some are not. (38) This is surely Suarez's account, since he argues using the restrictive sense of immanence. This view enables him to defend a broader sense of life than that allowed by immanence, because the notion of life he subscribes to does not depend on the type of actions that living beings are capable of, but rather on the perfections they possess or achieve. (39) That is why it can be said that a plant is alive even though its actions are of the same type as those produced by an extrinsic principle, (40) or that God lives despite the fact that first and second acts are not distinguished in him. Ultimately, the vitality of an action hinges on the agent's perfection, apart from whether those perfections are obtained through a causal motion or they are essentially possessed. (41) If we go in the opposite direction and take the improper sense of immanence, then the relation is inverted and the class of vital actions turns into a subset of the set of immanent actions. From this point of view, some immanent actions are per se and some are per accidens: the former are the vital actions while the latter are all the actions caused by the substantial form of a natural thing. Nonliving creatures do not have their own principle of motion. The fact that they perform some actions because of their form or nature is not enough to assume they move by themselves. Instead, such actions are attributed to the generating thing, since their forms are deemed to be instruments of the Creator of nature. Therefore, when water cools or when a heavy body moves downwards, it is God who acts through the form of each object, "just as the motion that emanates from an impetus is attributed to that which projects [the body] and impresses the impetus. For just as an impressed impetus, even though it is a true moving power and has within itself a sufficient power to produce that motion, nonetheless produces motions only as an instrument of the projector and in its stead, so, too, heaviness produces motion only as an instrument of the generating thing and in its stead." (42)

Regarding the second part of the conclusion, the actions effected by the form are never considered vital actions. The reason is that vital actions are directed toward a perfection of the agent, while the actions caused by a substantial form are not. The perfection of natural substances does not consist in the achievement of new states or qualities. Suarez declares that "living things are instituted by nature in such a way that they are able to perfect or actualize themselves ..., whereas nonliving things have per se only a repose in the perfection that, unless impeded by some other source, they receive from the generating thing." (43) Nonliving substances have a certain amount of perfections that they may lose by action on an external agent or else regain, but they can never add any further perfections to their nature. Hence, natural resulting and the eduction of a form do not have the effect of increasing the subject's perfection, they only restore some original one. When water cools off after being heated, the water does not gain a new quality: a prior perfection is reinstated by an action that seemingly is effected by the water itself, but it really comes about by virtue of the Creator of nature. "And so whenever things are kept by accident from their natural state and then later return to that state after the impediment has been removed, such a return is judged to occur not through their own action but instead through a natural resulting. And that is why it is attributed not so much to the things themselves as to the generating thing." (44)

In the light of the distinctions made, it can be tempting to assimilate natural resulting to any other natural action. One may perhaps also say, for instance, that once the sun is posited, the light naturally emanates or results in the air. However, this would be a serious mistake, because when a substantial form acts immediately, (45) it does so through a more intrinsic mode of natural action. (46) This has nothing to do with a new sense of immanence. What Suarez tries to stress is that natural emanation is an action closer to the essence of the agent or more fundamental than what the illumination of the air may be. "A natural resulting is wholly intrinsic and in a certain sense has to do with the completed production of a thing, since it tends solely toward constituting the thing in the connatural state which is per se owed to it by dint of its generation. By contrast, an action, speaking properly and in the sense in which an action is normally distinguished from a natural resulting, is instead extrinsic; and, speaking per se, it presupposes that the thing has already been constituted in its complete and natural state." (47)

Therefore, even though the efficiency of forms is neither vital nor immanent, at least strictly speaking, it certainly has the feature that it is constitutive. Natural resulting is the very first action that any substance can exercise because it constitutes the thing with the properties owed to it. In other words: no substance can act if its form has not emanated its very own powers.

VI

Francis Suarez claims that a substantial form may be an efficient cause (PFE) in a twofold way. The form is the proximate and immediate efficient principle of the production of the substance's proper accidents. This mode of the form's immediate action is called natural resulting. But the substantial form is also the principal efficient cause of the production of a similar form in distinct matter, despite not educing it by itself but only with the help of its accidents. Regarding the rest of the substance's actions, the form is just a remote principle.

The immediate efficiency of forms is common to each one of them. This obviously includes souls. Souls not only produce their power by a natural resulting, but they are also principles of the so-called vital actions, which are exclusive to animated compounds. Vital actions are perfective actions of living substances that cannot be reduced to immanent actions. The latter are caused by the highest powers of rational souls and, from the purest Suarezian point of view, they are a subset of the former. The same goes for their respective acts. As for natural resulting, it is neither vital nor immanent. It is a constitutive action of natural substances that, broadly speaking, may be considered as immanent per accidens.

Through natural resulting Suarez tries to explain how a bare natural compound comes to be a natural compound with properties. This explanation may seem of scarce importance in the eyes of natural science. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the Suarezian model posits an explanation that may be considered to be a first step in the transition from a substantialist conception of nature to an eventualist one. (48)

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(1) Francisco Suarez: *Opera Omnia*, ed. Carolo Bertono (Paris: Vives 1861), 25, 26. Henceforth, I will cite the *Disputationae Metaphysicae* by the abbreviation DM followed by disputation, section, and paragraph

numbers. If the translation is not mine, I will provide the translator and edition; otherwise, the translation is mine, and I will include the Latin text.

(2) See DM 15.1.16-19, translation by John Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy in *On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000), 28-31.

(3) We shall say that: X is an action if and only if X is a mode or dependence (different *ex natura rei* from the term produced) by which the active principle of a thing is primarily reduced to an act.

(4) See Helen Hattab, "Suarez's Last Stand for the Substantial Form," in *The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez*, eds. Benjamin Hill and Henrik Lagerlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012), 104-10.

(5) Several authors consider this thesis, among others, as a novelty and an anticipation of modern accounts. See: Vincent Carraud, *Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez a Leibniz* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2002); Olivo Gilles, "L'efficience en cause: Suarez, Descartes et la question de la causalite," in *Descartes et le Moyen Age*, eds. Joel Biard and Roshdi Rashed (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin 1997), 91-105; Pasquale Porro, "Cenni sulle principali trasformazioni del concetto di causa nel Medioevo," *Esercizi filosofici* 6 (2002): 91-101; Tad M. Schmaltz, *Descartes on Causation* (New York: Oxford University Press 2008), 9-48. However, it must be acknowledged that Henry of Ghent, John Buridan and even Thomas Aquinas (in spite of what can be read in *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 54, a. 1) had held before that forms are some sort of internal efficient causes. See: Robert Pasnau, "Forms, Substance and Mechanism," *The Philosophical Review* 113 (2004): 31-88; *Metaphysical Themes* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2011), 549-605.

(6) When the substantial form is considered as a formal cause its causality is its union with its prime matter, and its effect is a compound. This union is not an action, however, nor does it include any kind of efficiency. See DM 15.6.

(7) DM 18.3.4, translation by Alfred Freddoso in *On Efficient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18 and 19* (New Haven: Yale University Press 1994), 93-4.

(8) DM 18.3.7; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 95-6.

(9) DM 18.3.8; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 96-7.

(10) See Vidal Abril Castello, "La accion de resultancia, eje de rotacion del sistema suareciano," in *Homenaje a E. Elorduy*, ed. Pedro Rocamora Valls (Bilbao: Editorial Vizcaina 1978), 1-10 and Eleuterio Elorduy, "La accion de resultancia en Suarez," *Anales de la Catedra Francisco Suarez* 3 (1963): 45-71.

(11) John D. Kronen and Jeremiah Reedy, *On the Formal Cause of Substance: Metaphysical Disputation XV* (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press 2000), 38, n. 45.

(12) See DM 17.2.7.

(13) DM 18.2.23: "Nec satis est dicere formis attribui efficientiam quia ab illis manant qualitates, per quas solas exercent omnes actiones suas, quia, ut supra dicebamus, haec non est propria et per se efficientia, sed tantum remota et radicalis; nam actio quae immediate oritur a sola forma accidentali a sola etiam illa per se essentialiter pendet tamquam a principio proximo, ut omittam concursus causae universalis."

(14) DM 15.2.10: "Inter forms substantiales quasdam esse spirituales, et substantiales, et independentes a materia, quamvis eam vere informant; alias vero esse materiales itaque materiae inhaerentes ut ab ea in esse et fieri pendeant ..."

(15) DM 18.2.22; Freddoso, *On Efficient Causality*, 69.

(16) See DM 18.2.2.

(17) See DM 18.3.19.

(18) See DM 18.3.17.

(19) In the context of the *Disputationes* this claim is held to be true. Suarez relies so much on this thesis that the first argument he offers to justify the existence of the substantial forms is that the human being

possesses a soul as a form. This proposition is expressed in argument (1) given at the beginning of this article. Suarez builds his argument based on the immortality of the rational soul. First, the Jesuit infers that the human soul is a substance and not an accident. If this were not true, then the human soul could not subsist without a subject. Secondly, Suarez claims that in order to give life to the compound, the soul must be the form of the body. This is verified because a human's vital functions cease as soon its soul separates from the body. In this way, Suarez concludes that the rational soul is a substance and a form that configures its matter. It would be a mistake to think Suarez is trying to move away from the traditional proofs of the existence of forms. In fact, Suarez includes Aristotle and Aquinas's argument--it is summarized in argument (5) at the beginning of this work--, he just does not make it the cornerstone of his argument. Why does Suarez choose such a controversial thesis to ground his defense of forms? "But for Suarez's audience the soul's immortality may well have been the premise to start from since, with Aristotle's natural philosophy coming under increasing attack, it was the one thing that rival philosophical and theological factions could agree on ..." (Hattab, "Suarez's Last," 103). Just as Hattab points out, the soul's immortality is a thesis that even Descartes subscribed to, despite his mechanicism with regard to the body. However, the Suarezian strategy brings up several questions different from those faced by his predecessors. The burden of proof shifted from the need to demonstrate the soul and its immortality to the existence of forms in natural beings. Even though the initial presumption affirms that natural substances have form because they have the same ontological composition as the human being, this argument was not as solidly reasoned, considering the deep differences that separate natural beings from rational ones. That is why Suarez offers a variety of empirical proofs, mentioned in arguments (3), (4) and (5). These phenomenological arguments do most of the work for the demonstration of forms. Later, however, Suarez's reliance on these empirical proofs turned out to work against his purposes. When his physical explanations were overcome by modern science and theology was no longer considered a science, forms were left out without a rational justification. See Hattab, "Suarez's Last," 109-10.

(20) Francis Suarez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis De Anima*, trans. Salvador Castellote Cubells (Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones 1978) vol. 1, 114: "Cum ergo dicit quod anima est principium 'quo vivimus,' intelligitur de principio intrinseco quo operatur ipsum suppositum vivens, cui tamquam agenti tribuitur operatio; et tale principium necessario debet esse vera forma, quia forma sicut est principium essendi, ita et operandi." The translation is mine. Hereafter, I will cite the text as DA followed by the disputation, question, and section.

(21) DM 18.3.3: "Dico ergo primo: quando accidens fit per naturalme dimanationem, principium proximum illius secundum talem efficientiae modum, quicumque ille sit, potest esse substantia, si tale acciden sit immediate conexum cum illa ... nam intellectus, verbi gratia, proxime manat a substantia animae."

(22) According to Suarez, the rational soul does not participate in this action and is not subject to the weak reading of the principle, since the rational soul is created by God from nothing.

(23) See DA 1.2.5.

(24) See DA 1.4.10.

(25) DA 1.1.9: "Item, operationes vitales non tantum debent recipi in ipso operante, sed etiam debent fieri a principio intrinseco illius."

(26) See DM 48.6.9. It may not be superfluous to say that if X is an immanent action, then X cannot be a transitive action; the two classes are mutually exclusive.

(27) DM 48.6.10: "Aliquando vero extenditur nomen actionis immanentis ad omnem illam quae in supposito operante manet, et hoc modo omnes motus vitales, et nutritionis et augmentationis, et motus etiam localis animantium, poterunt immanentes appellari; item motus naturalis terrae deorsum tendentis, aut aquae reducentis se ad pristinam frigiditatem."

(28) Some specialists, such as Salvador Castellote, distinguish between organisms and anorganisms, that is living and nonliving beings, based on just this equivalence; they treat life as if it were nothing other than the capacity to act immanently. See Salvador Castellote Cubells, "La Antropologia de Suarez," *Anales del Seminario de Valencia* 3 (1963): 125-340.

(29) DM 48.2.8: "Hic ergo per actionem immanentem intelligimus veram ac propriam efficientiam quorundam actuum qui manent in ipsis potentiis a quibus fiunt easque informant." The translation is mine. A similar description can be found in DM 18.4.5: "Verius ergo dicitur: sicut illuminatio habet suum proprium

terminum intrinsecum, ad quem ipsa terminatur, hic autem est principium omnis ulterioris actionis, si quae est, quae ad rem illuminatam consequatur, ita actiones immanentes, ut actiones sunt, habere suos intrinsecos terminos, qui sunt qualitates, et has esse principia proxima ulterioris actionis, quando contingit subsequi."

(30) DM 43.5.13: "Item secundum hos actus vere dicimur quales, nempe boni aut mali, scientes, amantes, irati, etc. tern hi actus sunt formae ultimo actuantes ac perficientes substantias quibus insunt; ergo convenit illis communis ratio qualitatis supra assignata." X is a quality if and only if X is an act or form that modifies or determines another reality. Strictly speaking, a quality is something that expresses something outside the substance that it modifies. See DM 42.1.7.

(31) See DM 42.1.5.

(32) Suarez recovers the Aristotelian division of quality. According to him, four pairs of species exist: habit and disposition, natural power and natural handicap (naturalem potentiam et impotentiam), passive qualities and passions, figure and form. See DM 42.2.1. Immanent acts are included in the first class, and hence they are considered as dispositions, which are some kind of modifications that order either the body or the soul, according to their form or virtue. See DM 42.3.8.

(33) DM 42.3.8: "Item actus ultimi immanentes possunt dispositiones appellari, vel quatenus sunt effectus habituum, et ita constituunt peculiarem ordinem in potentia respectu habitus, vel certe secundum se, quatenus conferunt ultimam actualitatem potentiae, et ita ultimate perficiunt illam secundum quemdam ordinem...."

(34) See James P. Burns, "Action in Suarez," *The New Scholasticism* 37 (1964): 463-66.

(35) Suarez's point is that the effect of an exercise of, say, the intellect is a modification (or quality) of the intellect itself. This quality, effected by an action on the part of the intellect, is itself called an 'act' because it is the actualization of a certain cognitive potentiality. So within this act (call it A), as within any other quality effected by an efficient cause, we can distinguish the action, which is A's dependence on its efficient cause, from that which terminates the action, namely, the quality which is A itself." Freddoso, *On Efficient Causality*, 115, n. 11.

(36) DM 18.6.3: "Itaque potentiae animae ad actiones vitales merito dici possunt instrumenta coniuncta animae, quatenus illi subordinantur sicut principali formae, ut sine actuali influxu et quasi motione illius suas operationes efficere non possint."

(37) See DM 48.3.16.

(38) DM 48.6.10: "Ita fit ut propria actio immanens solum in vitalibus actionibus inveniatur, quamvis non convertatur, quia non omnis actio vitalis immanens est in proprietate iam dicta...."

(39) See Burns, "Action," 465.

(40) DM 18.5.5: "Actiones animae vegetativae, quoad substantiam, eiusdem esse rationis cure his quae ab extrinseco principio fiunt; omnes enim sunt aut motus locales, aut alterationes, veleductio formae substantialis, unde solum habent rationem actionis vitalis ex peculiari habitudine ad animam ut ad principium coniunctam in eodem supposito se movente. Sicut locutio hominis est actio vitalis, locutio autem angeli in corpore assumpto non est vitalis, licet sint similes in exteriori specie."

(41) See DM 30.14.7.

(42) DM 18.7.26; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 147.

(43) DM 18.7.28; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 150.

(44) DM 18.7.28; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 150.

(45) I am assuming here that the strong reading of the PFE is true.

(46) See DM 18.3.14.

(47) DM 18.3.14; Freddoso, *On Efficient*, 101.

(48) An earlier version of this paper was presented at a panel on "Francis Suarez and Causality" at the XLIX Reuniones Filosóficas of the University of Navarra. The paper is part of the project "Naturaleza y voluntad. La genesis de la contraposición entre necesidad natural y causalidad libre: de Escoto a Suarez" (FFI2010-15875), supported by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad del Gobierno de España, which belongs to the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad del Gobierno de España, which belongs to the "Línea de pensamiento clásico español" of the University of Navarra.

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